Public Choice

Contents of Volume 117 2003

Volume 117, Nos. 1-2

R. Cornes, R. Hartley, Risk aversion, heterogeneity and contests	1-25
T. Plümper, C.W. Martin, Democracy, government spending, and economic growth: A political-economic explanation of the Barro-	
effect	27-50
 T. Krieger, Voting on low-skill immigration under different pension regimes 	51-78
P. Poutvaara, Party platforms with endogenous party membership N. Berggren, N. Karlson, Constitutionalism, division of power and	79–98
transaction costs	99-124
R. Aaberge, A. Langørgen, Fiscal and spending behavior of local governments: Identification of price effects when prices are not	
observed 1 R.F. Potthoff, M.C. Munger, Use of integer programming to optim-	125–161
ize the scheduling of panels at annual meetings of the Public	
	163–175
W.V. Gehrlein, D. Lepelley, On some limitations of the median voting rule	177–190
K. Maske, G. Durden, The contributions and impact of Professor William H. Riker	191–220
Book reviews	
Malcolm Crook, <i>Elections in the French Revolution</i> (C. Lebeck) Paul H. Rubin, <i>Darwinian politics: The evolutionary origin of free-</i>	221–224
dom (A. Gifford, Jr.)	224-228
Stan J. Leibowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Winners, losers and Microsoft: Competition and antitrust in high technology (G.L.	
Brady)	228-231
Stanley L. Winer and Hirofumi Shibata (Eds.), Political economy and public finance: The role of political economy in the theory	
and practice of public economics (R.G. Holcombe)	231-234

Volume 117, Nos. 3-4

N. Frohlich, J. Oppenheimer, Editor's introduction	235-238
K.L. Dougherty, Public goods theory from eighteenth century polit-	
ical philosophy to twentieth century economics	239-253
P. Kurrild-Klitgaard, G. Tinggaard Svendsen, Rational bandits:	
Plunder, public goods, and the Vikings	255-272
N. Frohlich, J. Oppenheimer, Optimal policies and socially ori-	
ented behavior: Some problematic effects of an incentive com-	
patible device	273-293
T.K. Ahn, E. Ostrom, J.M. Walker, Heterogeneous preferences	
and collective action	295-314
A. Lupia, G. Sin, Which public goods are endangered?: How	
evolving communication technologies affect The logic of col-	
lective action	315-331
D. Coates, J.C. Heckelman, Interest groups and investment: A	
further test of the Olson hypothesis	333-340
S. Knack, Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence on	
the Olson and Putnam hypotheses	341-355
O. Azfar, T. Matheson, Market-mobilized capital	357-372
Instructions to authors	373-374
Author index	375
Volume contents	377–378
Call for papers	379

